

KANSAINVÄLISTEN SUHTEIDEN TUTKIMUKSEN SEURA  
THE FINNISH INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION

# KATSE

## Jäsenkirje 2013





## Kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimuksen seura (KATSE)

Kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimuksen seura perustettiin 1.10.1993. Sen tarkoituksena on edistää kansainvälisten suhteiden sekä ulko- ja maailmanpolitiikan tutkimusta ja harrastusta Suomessa. Seuran toiminta-ajatuksena on monitieteisyys. Seura järjestää esitelmä- ja keskustelutilaisuuksia ja pyrkii harjoittamaan julkaisutoimintaa eri muodoissa.

Seuran johtokunnan valitsee syysvuosikokous. Toimintavuonna 2013 puheenjohtajana toimi Juha Vuori, varapuheenjohtajana Leena Koitilainen ja sihteerinä Annina Kärkkäinen. Muut jäsenet olivat Mika Aaltola, Tuomas Forsberg, Juha Jokela, Minna Jokela, Aini Linjakumpu, Juha Martelius, Teemu Palosaari, Ville Sinkkonen, Tanja Tamminen, Pilvi Torsti ja Henri Vogt.

Seuran jäsenmaksu toimintavuonna 2014 on 18 euroa; perustutkinto-opiskelijoilta 9 euroa. Yhdistyksiltä ja seuroilta jäsenmaksu on 16 senttiä/jäsen (väh. 56 euroa). Kannatusjäseniksi voivat liittyä sellaiset yhteisöt, jotka haluavat tukea seuran toimintaa. Jäseneksi voi liittyä maksamalla jäsenmaksun KATSEen tilille Sampo 800015-70240573. Viestiksi mukaan osoite ja sähköpostiosoite, niin jäsenkirje ja muu posti löytää perille.

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# Väistyvän puheenjohtajan tervehdys



Juha A. Vuori

Aika juoksee kun on hauskaa tai paljon tekemistä. Myös kolme vuotta KATSE:n puheenjohtajana ovat vierähtäneet häkellyttävällä vauhdilla, ja puheenjohtajakapulakin on jo menestyksellä siirtymässä seuraajalle. Tässä yhteydessä on otollista katsella kuluneita vuosia ja hahmotella näkyjä tulevaan.

Puheenjohtajakaudellani KATSE on jatkanut jo jonkin aikaa vakiintuneina olleita polkuja. Pääasiallinen toimintamuoto on kolmivuositain järjestettävä KATSE:n konferenssi, joka pidettiin viimeksi Naantalin kylpylässä 11.-12.1.2013. Edeltäjiensä tavoin alan kansallista kokoontumista voidaan pitää menestyksenä, sillä paikalla oli jälleen yli 90 osallistujaa ja esitysten määrässä (72) tehtiin uusi ennätys. Kolme vuotta konferenssien välillä on ilmeisen toimiva malli nykymaailmassa, jossa kansainvälisiä kokouksia on yllin kyllin. Paikalle saapuu merkittävä enemmistö suomalaisista alan toimijoista.

Tällä kertaa konferenssin täysi-istuntojen teemana oli suomalaisen kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimuksen tila vuosikymmen Suomen Akatemian tieteenalaraportin jälkeen. Tuohon kölinaltavetoon nähden tilanne on erinomainen: kenttä on monikärkisen kansainvälinen ja julkaisutoiminta on siirtynyt laitosfoorumeista kovimpiin kansainvälisiin lehtiin. Nousevat tutkijasukupolvet ovat lähtökohtaisesti kansainvälisesti orientoituneita, joten kehityskulun voidaan olettaa jatkuvan. Pohjoismaisessa vertailussa Suomi on kuitenkin edelleen muita jäljessä niin julkaisujen kuin henkilöstön määrässä. Konferenssin teema onkin saanut aikaan mielenkiintoa syvempään paneutumiseen pohjoismaisen kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimuksen vertailussa.

Kääntöpuolena panostuksilla kansainväliseen julkaisutoimintaan on ollut suomeksi tapahtuvan julkaisemisen surkastuminen. Kenties tätäkin huolestuttavampaa on ollut Suomen kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimuksen väheneminen. Akatemian tieteenalaraportilla lienee oma merkityksensä myös tässä: siinä listatut aiheet ovat olleet kuin radioaktiivisia ja siten välteltäviä. Tieteenalaraportin puoliintumisaika tosin taitaa olla noin vuosikymmen, sillä myös Suomen ulkopoliitikka on saanut jälleen laajentunutt tutkimuksellista huomiota.

Julkaisufoorumin ja muiden paineiden myötä suomeksi julkaisemisen näköalat eivät kuitenkaan vaikuta yhtä otollisilta kuin uusi kiinnostus Suomen ulkosuhteita kohtaan antaa ymmärtää. Katsottaessa suomeksi julkaistuja artikkeleita, suurin osa niiden kirjoittajista on uriansa alkupuolella olevia tutkijoita. Lisäpanostukset suomeksi julkaisemiseen edellyttäisivät etabloituneilta tutkijoilta tietoista menoa rakenteellisia kannustinohjustimia vastaan.

Voidaan tietysti myös kysyä onko suomeksi julkaiseminen yleensä tarpeen, ja tarvitaanko alalla erillistä kansallista yhdistystä. Kuten Naantalin konferenssi jälleen osoitti, kansalliset kokoukset ovat tarpeellisia: näin laaja-alaista kokoontumista ei muuten saataisi aikaiseksi. Ja vaikka yliopistolaisten tehtävä on palvella ihmiskuntaa, ei pidä unohtaa vuorovaikutusta muun suomalaisen yhteikunnan kanssa - mihin KATSE tarjoaa otollisen foorumin. Myös valtionhallinnossa kansainvälisiä suhteita toteuttaville on hyvä saada tutkijoiden näkemyksiä asioista. KATSEella on tehtävä ja rooli myös tulevaisuudessa.

KATSE:n konferenssit ovat myös tärkeitä uusien tutkijasukupolvien integroimisessa olemassaolevaan tutkijakenttään. Tästä käy hyvänä esimerkkinä se, että KATSE:n nykyinen ja tuleva puheenjohtaja Leena Malkki tapasivat toisensa ensimmäisen kerran KATSE:n ensimmäisen konferenssin panelisteina vuonna 2003. Vuoden 2013 konferenssissa esiintyi myös varmasti tulevia seuran puheenjohtajia.

Katse kohti uusia haasteita,

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Käsissäsi oleva jäsenkirje kaiuttaa joitain Naantalin konferenssissa käsiteltyjä teemoja ja kokoaa yhteen KATSE:n käsiinsä saamia viime vuosien väitöskirjojen lektioita. Uutiskirje tekee myös uuden avauksen julkaisemalla ensimmäistä kertaa kollaasin kansainvälisistä suhteista.

## KATSE:n uutiskirje haastatteli professori Heikki Patomäkeä kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimuksen ongelmista ja vahvuuksista.



Heikki Patomäki

### Mitkä ovat tämänhetkisen suomalaisen kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimuksen kolme keskeisintä ongelmaa?

Alan suomalaista tutkimusta ei voi enää eristää vain Suomeen, sillä suomalaisia tutkijoita on toiminut ja toimii muuallakin, esimerkiksi muissa Pohjoismaissa, Britanniassa ja Yhdysvalloissa. Kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimuksen metodologisia ja muita ongelmia ei voi myöskään käsitellä vain Suomen kautta, vaikka tšekäläisessä tutkimuksessa onkin omia erityispiirteitään. Ja viimein suomalaisen alan tutkimuksen ongelmia ei voi eristää yliopistomaailman myllerryksistä ja jatkuvasti muuttuvista institutionaalisista puitteista, joka koskee kaikkia tieteenaloja, ja omalla tavallaan nimenomaan ihmistieteitä, joiden osa kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimus on.

Kysymys on siis potentiaalisesti todella laaja. Jotta siihen voisi vastata edes jotenkin mielekkäästi, nostan esille ainoastaan kaksi sisällöllistä ja metodologista kysymystä ja keskityn nimenomaan Suomessa tehtyyn alan tutkimukseen. Suomessa heilahdus positivismista post-positivismiin on ollut jyrkempi kuin melkein missään muualla. 1970-luvulla täällä tehtiin metodologisesti kurinalaista positivistista tutkimusta, usein rauhantutkimuksen traditiossa, mutta tultaessa 2000-luvulle ja 2010-luvulle koko alalla ei ole enää yhtään positivistia. Alan tutkimus on nykyään ”kvalitatiivista”, perustuen yleensä konstruktivismiin, feminismiin tai post-strukturalismiin, tai johonkin yhdistelmään näitä, joskin myös kriittinen realismi ja uusgramscilainen poliittinen talous on saanut maassa jalansijan. Yleisin käytetty ”menetelmä” on joka tapauksessa nykyään diskurssianalyysi. Ja toki käytännönläheisimmissä tutkimuslaitoksissa tehdään myös ihan perinteisiä selvityksiä monista aiheista.

Tässä piileekin mielestäni alan tutkimuksen ensimmäinen ongelma. Positivismin myötä on hylätty myös systemaattinen pyrkimys tiedon kasautumiseen, yhteiseen oppimiseen vastavuoroisen kritiikin kautta, sekä pyrkimys hypoteesien testaamiseen ja väitteiden falsifointiin. Ei vallitse vain pluralismi ”kvalitatiivisten” lähestymistapojen sisällä ja välillä vaan suoranainen relativismi, jossa kuka tahansa voi sanoa melkein mitä tahansa tarvitsematta pelätä kritiikkiä tai ottaa vastuuta sanomistensa käytännöllisistä seurauksista.

Kukin erikoistuu omaan pieneen alakenttäänsä, joita voi aika ajoin vähän vaihtaa, ja oletuksena on, että pääsääntöisesti vain saman alakentän tutkijat puhuvat toisilleen sisällöstä. Tuloksena on pienen suomalaisen kentän fragmentaatio, joka heijastaa fragmentaatiota oppialan laajemmissa konteksteissa.

En kaipaa paluuta positivismiin sinänsä, mutta olisi jo aika siirtyä post-positivismin jälkeiseen kauteen, kohti kriittistä synteisiä, jossa positivismin tieteellisiä hyveitä opittaisiin arvostamaan enemmän. Kriittisen tieteellisen realismin lisäksi ainakin pragmatismi on ottanut askelia tähän suuntaan, ja kaikenlaiset synteisit

eri metateorioiden välillä ovat mahdollisia, mutta ilman systemaattista pyrkimystä yhteiseen oppimiseen ja vastavuoroiseen kritiikkiin edistys ei ole mahdollista, ei myöskään merkittävät teoreettiset kontribuutiot.

Toinen keskeinen ongelma, jonka haluaisin tässä mainita, on tutkimuksen ajallinen suuntautuneisuus. Tällä on myös suoria vaikutuksia tutkimuksen vaikuttavuuteen tai -- paremmin ilmaistuna -- käytännölliseen relevanssiin. Suurin osa alan tutkimuksesta rajautuu lähimenneisyyden tutkimukseksi, joskus historiallinen horisontti voi tosin ulottua kauemmaksikin. Käytännöllinen toiminta on kuitenkin aina suuntautunut myös -- ja aivan erityisesti -- tulevaisuuteen. Mitä virkaa on sellaisella yhteiskuntatieteellisellä tutkimuksella, joka ei osaa tai edes yritä sanoa mitään tulevaisuudesta?

Toki tämä retorinen kysymys on aika ladattu ja turhan vahva, sillä ilman historian tuntemusta ei tulevaisuuttakaan voi ennakoida. Ilmassa on joka tapauksessa monia merkkejä yhteiskuntatieteiden ja maailmanpolitiikan tutkimuksen ajallisesta käänteestä, jossa kausaalisten prosessien temporaalisuus otetaan aiempaa vakavammin, ja jossa tutkimus on aiempaa enemmän tulevaisuus-orientoitunutta.

### **Minkälaisia vahvuuksia näet suomalaisella kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimukselle olevan?**

Tähänkään kysymykseen ei ole aivan yksinkertaista vastata, koska vahvuudetkin ovat jatkuvassa muutoksen tilassa ja alttiina monien ristiriitaistenkin kenttien yhteisvaikutukselle. 1980- ja 90-luvuilla suomalainen maisterin tutkinto oli poikkeuksellisen perusteellinen ja laaja-alainen ja tarjosi ainakin periaatteessa erinomaiset eväät tutkimukselle. Sittemmin tutkinnonuudistuksen myötä perusopintoja on kevennetty (jatko-opintovaatimuksia kevennettiin jo aiemmin). Nykyisille opiskelijoille ja jatko-opiskelijoille on toisaalta aiempaa selvempää, tai itsestään selvempää, ettei Suomi ole mikään erillinen ihmemaa, jossa kaikki asiat ovat toisin, ja jossa kannattaa keskittyä policy-debatteihin laitossarjoissa ja lehtien palstoilla.

Mitä tulee näkyvään kansainväliseen julkaisutoimintaan, suomalainen alan tutkimus on nykyään vahvempaa kuin mitä se oli 10 tai 20 vuotta sitten. On hyvä, että suomalaiset ovat aiempaa vähemmän mukana kansainvälisissä projekteissa vain edustamassa "suomalaista ulkopoliittista näkökulmaa". Keskimäärin heistä on tullut aiempaa enemmän periferian intellektuelleja, jotka osallistuvat varsinkin anglo-amerikkalaisten keskustusten keskusteluihin.

Kari Palosen mainioita neljännesvuosisadan takaisia erotteluja hyödyntäen -- ja edelleen kehitellen -- voi kuitenkin sanoa, että näin saavutetussa avoimuudessa on myös omat rajoituksensa. Valinta keskustusten välillä tapahtuu lähinnä akselilla Britannia vs. Yhdysvallat. Voi kysyä myös missä määrin suomalaiset alan tutkijat ovat itsetietoisesti orgaanisia intellektuelleja, joko periferiassa tai kosmopoliittisesti? Missä määrin asenne on pikemminkin välinpitämättömyys, jossa omaa geo-historiallista taustaa ja asemoitumista ei systemaattisesti hyödynnetä luovien erojen tuottamisessa ja keskusta-periferia jakojen murtamisessa tai kääntämisessä, vaan ollaan ikään kuin oltaisiin keskuksessa, mutta käytännössä toimitaan vain ikään kuin sen pääteasemana. Keskuksen ja periferian ero voi näin kaventua paljonkin, ja onkin kaventunut, mutta liian yksipuolisesti keskuksen tai keskustusten ehdoilla.

# Ikkunoita Barentsin energiamaisemaan



Hanna Lempinen

Suomen, Ruotsin, Norjan ja Venäjän pohjoisista maakunnista ja niitä ympäröivistä merialueista koostuva Barentsin alue kuvataan nykypäivän energiakeskusteluissa maailman uutena energiaprovinssina. Öljyn, kaasun, jättiläisinvestointien ja resurssikamppailujen luonnehtiman näkökulman rinnalla on mahdollista nähdä myös toisenlainen alueellinen energiamaisema.

## Energiaa Barentsilta

Energiantuotanto on siirtymässä kohti yhä pohjoisempia alueita mittavien öljy- ja kaasuvarantojen, muuttuvan ilmaston mukanaan tuomien hyödyntämis- ja kuljetusmahdollisuuksien sekä globaalin energiankulutuksen kasvuennusteiden vauhdittamana. Energiateollisuutta juuri Barentsinmerelle työntävät yhtäältä EU:nkin tärkeimpien energiakauppakumppaneiden, Norjan ja Venäjän, ehtyvät resurssit käytössä olevilla tuotantoalueillaan sekä näiden maiden sitoumukset toimittaa energiaa kauppakumppaneilleen myös tulevaisuudessa. Tämän päivän Barentsin energiantuotanto ei kuitenkaan – ainakaan vielä – yllä täyttämään siihen kohdistettuja odotuksia ja toiveita. Suurista investoinneista ja huomattavasta poliittisesta tuesta huolimatta pohjoiset projektit niin Norjan kuin Venäjän merialueilla kärsivät viivästyksistä ja vastoinkäymisistä, teknologisista haasteista ja käsistä karkaavista kustannuksista.

Barentsin aluetta leimaavat toiveikkaat tulevaisuudenkuvat (energia)teollisuuden kasvunäkymistä houkuttelevat osalliseksi yhä laajempaa toimijakirjoa. Alueen valtioiden, alueellisten yhteistyöelinten, maakunnallisten toimijoiden ja kansalaisjärjestöjen rinnalla myös – muiden muassa – kansalliset ja ylikansalliset yritykset, sijoittajat, kansainväliset rahoituslaitokset sekä Euroopan unioni pyrkivät muokkaamaan alueen energiapoliittisia käytäntöjä ja kehityskulkuja. Barentsin alueen energiamaisemaa eivät kuitenkaan kansoita pelkästään ihmistoimijat ja toimijakollektiivit, vaan sitä ovat muodostamassa ja muokkaamassa myös materiaaliset ja kielelliset elementit – esimerkiksi tunnettujen resurssien sijainti ja määrä, fyysikaalisen ympäristön olosuhteet ja ilmasto, infrastruktuuri ja teknologia, lainsäädäntö ja poliittiset järjestelmät sekä energiapoliittisten keskustelujen vakiintuneet käsitteellistämisen tavat.

Populaareissa ja poliittisissa keskusteluissa Barentsin alueen energiamaisema rakentuu usein uhkakuvien luonnehtimana valtioiden keskinäisen kilpajuoksun ja resursseista käytävän kamppailun nollasummapelinä. Etenkin Venäjän toimia strategisten öljy- ja kaasuvarantojensa uudelleen kansallistamiseksi - Neuvostoliiton hajoamista seuranneiden hallitsemattomien yksityistämisten jälkeen - on tulkittu resurssinationalismin ja geopoliittisen valtakamppailun näkökulmasta. Toisaalta Venäjän ja Norjan vuosikymmeniä kestäneiden neuvottelujen jälkeen vuonna 2011 ratifioimaa delimitaatio sopimusta on pidetty kansainvälisestäikin malliesimerkkinä valtionrajoihin liittyvien kiistojen rauhanomaisesta ratkaisemisesta kansainvälisen oikeuden periaatteisiin nojautuen. Saavutettu sopimus määrittää paitsi valtioiden välisen merirajan Barentsinmerellä



myös yhteistyön pelisäännöt alueella sijaitsevien luonnonvarojen, kuten öljyn, kaasun ja kalavarantojen hyödyntämisessä.

### **Barentsinmereltä Barentsille**

Poliittisissa ja akateemisissa keskusteluissa Barentsin alue supistuu usein viittaamaan ainoastaan Barentsin merialueiden öljy- ja kaasuvarantojen hyödyntämiseen, niihin kohdistuvaan kansainväliseen kilpailuun sekä niihin liittyvään poliittiseen ja taloudelliseen yhteistyöhön. Laajemmin ymmärrettynä Barentsin alueen – siis Suomen, Ruotsin, Norjan ja Venäjän pohjoisten maakuntien – energiamaisema muuttuu kuitenkin ratkaisevasti. Öljyn ja kaasun rinnalle keskusteluihin nousevat alueen mittavat vesivoimavarannot, rannikoiden huomattava tuulivoimapotentiaali, metsäalueiden bioenergiaresurssit, energiainfrastruktuurin modernisointi, Kuolan niemimaan jatkoajalla toimivat ydinvoimalat sekä edellä mainittuihin liittyvät alueelliset ja kansalliset strategiat, investoinnit ja kamppailut.

Energiakysymys kietoutuu monitahoisesti myös alue- ja sisäpoliittisiin keskusteluihin; sekä Norjan että Venäjän pohjoisissa strategioissa energiavarannoilla on alueellisen, taloudellisen ja sosiaalisen kehityksen tulevaisuudenkuvisa merkittävä rooli. Barentsinmereltä Barentsille matkattaessa öljy- ja kaasuvarantojen dominoiman horisontin haastaakin sosiaalisesti, ympäristöllisesti, taloudellisesti ja poliittisesti monimuotoinen alueellinen energiamaisema. Näennäisesti alueellinen kehitys nivoutuu myös osaksi globaaleja keskusteluja ja kehityskulkuja muun muassa markkinoiden, sijoitusten ja omistussuhteiden, infrastruktuurin, teknologioiden, poliittisten ja lainsäädännöllisten sitoumusten sekä ilmasto- ja ympäristökysymysten kautta.

### **Tutkimus(ta) energiamaisemassa**

Tutkijalle energiamaiseman monimuotoisuus ja energiakeskusteluja ja -politiikkaa muotoilevien tekijöiden ja toimijoiden vuorovaikutteinen mosaiikki paitsi asettaa tutkimusongelman rajaukseen, teoreettisiin tulokulmiin ja aineistonvalintaan liittyviä haasteita, myös nostaa esiin kysymyksen politiikkatieteellisen tutkimuksen tehtävästä ja sen suhteesta yhteiskuntaan ja päätöksentekoon. Tutkimuksen aiheet, tavoitteet ja lopputulemat määrittyvät pitkälti sen mukaan, ymmärretäänkö tutkimuksen tavoitteeksi poliittista päätöksentekoa ja toimeenpanoa tukevan tiedon tuottaminen vaiko käytäntöjen, keskustelujen ja keskustelematta jättämisten kriittinen tarkastelu.

## Avantgarde IR - huumori, nauru ja hulluttelu kansainvälisissä suhteissa



Saara Särmä

KATSE:n konferenssin työryhmämme "Avantgarde IR - huumori, nauru ja hulluttelu kansainvälisissä suhteissa" tarkoituksena oli karnevalisoida kansainvälisen politiikan niin kovin vakavaa tutkimuksenkenttää tuomalla esiin huomiotta jääneitä positiivisia teemoja kuten huumori, ilo, onnellisuus ja nauru. Avoimen ja vastaanottavaisen tunnelman virittämiseksi soitimme työryhmätilassa musiikkia työryhmän järjestäytyessä. Jokainen esitys käsitteli omalta osaltaan kysymyksiä siitä mihin iloa, huumoria, onnellisuutta ja naurua tarvitaan kansainvälisessä politiikassa ja sen tutkimuksessa sekä mitä näihin positiivisiin teemoihin keskittyminen tarkoittaa tieteenalan kannalta. Nauru ja hulluttelu kansainvälisessä politiikassa herätti uteliaisuutta ja keskustelua yleisössä. Analyyttinen katseen suuntaaminen positiivisiin ja naurettaviin teemoihin on mitä ilmeisemmin toivottu avaus, sillä hankaluus sovittaa kyseisiä materiaaleja vakavamieliseen tutkimukseen on tuttu kokemus tieteenalan harjoittajille. Samalla tämä avaus herättää tarpeellisia kysymyksiä siitä mitä on tietäminen, tieto, tiedon subjekti ja asiantuntijuuden funktio. Oheinen kollaasi yhdistelee työryhmässä käsitellyt teemat visuaaliseen muotoon ja kutsuu katsojan tekemään oman tulkintansa käsittelemistämme teemoista. Tällä evästyksellä haluamme omalta osaltamme toivottaa KATSE:n jäsenille luovaa ja hauskaa vuotta 2013 sekä ilon ja onnistumisen kokemuksia tieteen ja taiteen saralla!

Työryhmän puolesta,

Saara Särmä



# The Art of Adaptation. A study on the Europeanization of Finnish foreign and security policy



Teemu Palosaari  
Lectio praecursoria  
University of Helsinki, 25 February 2011

\* 1 \*

Let us imagine that a state A joins an international organization. The accession and membership, obviously, presents a change in the state's foreign policy. Let us then assume that the international organization in question has its own common foreign and security policy, jointly decided upon by the memberstates.

Therefore, for the state, the membership implies continuing change of national foreign and security policy: the state has to adapt to the common policy of the organization, and it also has to try to influence, and contribute to, the common policy.

Let us now complicate the picture by assuming that a central feature of the organization in question is a continuing political process which aims to deeper integration in a number of policy areas, foreign, security and defence policies included.

Now, to lower the level of abstraction, let us replace the state A with Finland and the organization with the European Union.

\* 2 \*

In 1995, the year Finland joined the EU, the Prime Minister of Finland stated that: "The EU membership strengthens the foundations of Finnish security. (...) As a small country we have to adapt, but we also wish to influence. That is the key question in our security policy currently." (Lipponen 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 1/1995, Security in a Changing World. Guidelines for Finland's Security Policy.)

"We have to adapt, but we also wish to influence." That is the question. My dissertation looks at how the alleged key questions of Finnish security policy – "adaptation and wish to influence" – have been realised. It asks the question: how Finnish foreign and security policy has been influenced by the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy.

My key argument is that the impact has been more profound than the previous studies indicate. Finnish foreign and security policy has undergone significant change during the EU membership. I argue, that the central elements defining Finnish state identity have changed and thus "Finland" (as an international actor) is not what it used to be. For Finland, the EU's foreign, security and defence policies represent not only a tool for responding to changes in the international security environment but also a new means of self-identification.

\* 3 \*

As the title of my thesis indicates: it is a study on Europeanization. Basically, Europeanization means that something in the domestic system is affected by something European. So Europeanization studies try to retrace the effects of European integration process at the national level.

As an approach it has its roots in three “theoretical turns” in European Studies (which relate to the general International Relations debate too): Firstly, there’s the development trend inspired by Comparative Political Science, which has shifted the focus of studies from the EU level to the domestic level. Secondly, there’s a so-called institutional turn or new institutionalism, that argues that institutions – be they legal organizations or informal norms – affect political actions and outcomes. The third theoretical turn, then, is the emergence of constructivist EU studies.

Europeanization can take place in two directions: Firstly, we can focus on the impact of European integration on member states. This is called the “national adaptation”; it is a top-down process. It means that a memberstate makes changes in response to the demands or expectations of the EU. The process can also take place the other way around: this is the so-called bottom-up direction, national projection. So, it is question of the impact of the memberstates on the European integration.

What then sets the process of Europeanization in motion? Here, the literature uses the concepts of misfit and adaptational pressure. For instance, if the collective understandings attached to European policies are not resonating well with domestic ones they cause adaptational pressures. This is what I call thick Europeanization: it means changes in the domestic understandings, interests and identities. In contrast to that, thin Europeanization, refers to changes, for instance, in the national structures or policies, or legislation, or division-of-power.

Here we can note that theory-wise thin and thick Europeanization actually rest on different metatheoretical, or epistemological backgrounds: the other focusing more on meanings, perceptions, justifications and understanding; and the other more oriented towards explanation, cause and effect.

\* 4 \*

So, if we look at the EU and Finland from this theoretical perspective, we firstly see that the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is the source adaptational pressure. Furthermore, the pressure caused by it has gradually increased during the years of Finnish EU membership. Since the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam we have witnessed the launch of European Security and Defence Policy, European security strategy, military and civil crisis management operations (for instance in Kosovo, Bosnia, Macedonia, Congo, Chad, coast of Somalia, Aceh, Georgia and so on), and also the launch of the EU battle groups. Moreover, in EU Studies it is typically seen that CFSP “has become a critical sociological force and venue that shapes perceptions” among the memberstates.

What makes the Finnish case interesting from the Europeanization perspective is that there has been a change from neutrality to “full political commitment to European integration” and to “military non-alignment”. Or to quote another Finnish Prime Minister here, Finland is currently “neither neutral nor non-aligned”. (Vanhanen 4.4.2004, Prime Minister’s Review of Foreign and Security Policy.)

What also makes the Finnish case attractive for Europeanization studies is that security policy has traditionally played a crucial role in Finland. In the domestic understandings it has been strongly linked to the survival of the country. Then, there is also the non-NATO-membership which also draws Finland apart from the European mainstream. Thanks to it, questions concerning the defence policy of EU carry a different weight in the Finland than in most of the other EU members.

\* 5 \*

My study builds on the understanding of foreign and security policy as a practice that reproduces state identity. This is to say that foreign and security policy tells us how the state in question places itself – identifies – in the international system. The way to study state identity change is to analyse the central foreign policy concepts and their change in the domestic discourse, as well as how they appear in the political argumentation.

Consequently, the primary material of my study consists of the official documentation on Finnish foreign and security policy and related the parliamentary debates. The white books on foreign, security and defence policy, “Government Reports to the Parliament” as they are called (turvallisuuksipoliittiset selonteot), and the Government Proposals, bills on the peacekeeping legislation and the related processes: parliamentary debates, Parliament Committees’ Reports and Statements – these all proved out to be very useful.

The process around Government Reports has been sometimes called “national security therapy”: it is a focal point where parliamentary debate, expert discussions, public opinion and public expectations and media meet in Finland. By complementing the Government texts with the parliamentary debates it was possible to see how the Government documents often construct an image of continuity of national foreign and security policy and present the changes that have taken place often as being minor or technical in nature.

Moreover, there were cases where the Government texts did not refer directly to the EU’s impact whereas in the domestic debate this was a constant and highly visible theme.

By including the parliamentary debates in the research material it was possible to see better how the domestic foreign and security policy discourse is influenced by European issues. Sometimes this also made the empirical analysis painfully slow; I went through thousands of parliamentary speeches.

\* 6 \*

My empirical analysis suggests that CFSP has played a significant, albeit in some cases indirect, role in changes in: Finnish peacekeeping/crisis management, in the interpretation of non-alignment, the relationship of national defence and crisis management – and their profiles as the tasks of National Defence Forces. CFSP has also influenced the division of power among the President, Prime Minister/Council of State and also the Parliament in foreign policy-making. For instance, the so-called Constitutional crisis of 2005 and 2006 was largely about how the national decision to send out EU crisis management troops and battle groups should be made.

Before Finland joined the EU, the European Commission noted that there is a considerable misfit between Finnish foreign and security policy (“military non-alliance combined with an independent defence”) and EU’s defence dimension (“the eventual framing a common defence policy”). The Commission called for further confirmation during the accession negotiations with regard to Finland’s commitment to the CFSP.

Finnish response was national adaptation in which the meaning of neutrality was redefined. So, when “non-alignment met CFSP” an interplay of domestic and international expectations typical for Europeanization process started. And gradually in the domestic debate there was feeling gaining ground that the credibility of the concept of military non-alignment had begun to falter, due to the increasing commitment to ESDP. Eventually in the official interpretation military non-alignment was reconstructed as a more technical, and less political qualifier that refers mostly to the way in which national defence is organized and implemented in practice.

Thus we can conclude firstly that Finnish non-alignment has been made compatible with EU’s evolving defence dimension. Full commitment to ESDP has been announced, including the defence plans, solidarity clause, civil and military crisis management and the battle groups.

However, it can be also concluded that the unclear status of EU defence policy has left room for national interpretation on what actually is the adaptation pressure caused by it. Thus it has been possible to stick to the concept of military non-alignment, and to preserve certain resonance with the old state identity element of neutrality.

Two cases of national projection (the bottom-up direction of Europeanization, memberstates influencing the EU) related to the issue of non-alignment can be located. In these cases Finland joined forces with other neutral or non-aligned EU members, and in order not to compromise its status as military non-aligned country made an attempt to keep common defence out of the EU. The first case related to the question of rearranging the relationship between Western European Union (and its security guarantee clause) and the EU; the other was about the formulation of common defence clause in the proposed European Constitution.

All in all, when we look at non-alignment, the conclusion is that this element of Finnish state identity has been effectively Europeanized: Finland finds itself not impartial, but part of the European “we”. As it is stated in a Government Report:

“Finland cannot be impartial in a conflict between the Union and a third party”

Another major shift has concerned the move from peacekeeping to crisis management. During the first years of Finnish EU membership, crisis management was often understood as unsuitable for Finland since it was not compatible with Finland’s traditional state identity and role in international politics as a small state. It was felt that crisis management would abolish the credibility of Finland as a trustworthy traditional UN-oriented peacekeeper. Therefore the concept “enhanced peacekeeping” was introduced as a sort of a middle ground between traditional peacekeeping and military crisis management. Later on, however, the EU crisis management becomes to be perceived as a factor that sets the future directions of Finnish peacekeeping. For instance, it is seen that because of the Finnish participation in EU crisis management operations and battle groups, it is necessary to amend the Finnish peacekeeping policy and legislation.

So, it can be concluded that at first the UN-orientation and national restrictions in use of force were seen as a positive factor that resonates with the peacekeeping, neutrality and small state elements of Finnish state identity. Later on, such features were to a lessening degree understood to provide material for Finnish state identity reproduction. Instead they were seen as a misfit that should be removed so that Finland can be similar to the other EU members when it comes to crisis management.

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Mr. Custos, Mr. Opponent, I would like to conclude by referring to the infamous driftwood theory (ajopuuteoria), which, as we all know has been effectively sank, discredited and dismissed by current historians. But in that theory Finland was portrayed as a piece of floating driftwood in the stream of world politics, with no control over the events.

When reading the parliamentary debates (starting from 1994, up to 2008) it occurred to me that a common view in Finnish domestic discourse seems to be that Finland is no longer a lonesome log or a single piece of driftwood shooting the rapids of world politics alone.

Rather, it is seen that Finland is tied into a raft of logs - a European raft - and floating together, and therefore more steadily and peacefully, as the mass of the common raft cushions and softens the blows and collisions and sudden movements.

So there appears to be a common understanding that this is the case, and that it is a favourable way to be. But, then, how tightly Finland should be connected to that European raft – should Finland remain on the outer rim, or should Finland aim at the core of the raft – that is debated.

And there are also different views when it comes to the question does Finland possess any “boat hook” or “pole” with which to steer the raft? Or is it so that once you are an integral part of the raft, you can only go with the flow.

In this debate European arguments have been “domesticated”, and surely, used for domestic purposes too. But to me the debate seems open, and vivid, and foreign policy has been somehow de-mystified in Finland, its no longer just black and white, but there are debatable issues. There is a clear trend of post-consensus. The Finnish debate on foreign, security and defence policy now touches upon values and ethics: you have international, even global responsibility, alongside national interests, questions of national defence and international military crisis management, European solidarity and national interest. It is all there.

And that is what I’d like to call the art of adaptation.



# How to do Security with Words: A Grammar of Securitisation in the People's Republic of China



Juha A. Vuori

Lectio praecursoria

University of Turku, 12 September 2011

What is happening here? My larynx produces vibrations that travel through the air as sound waves, which are collected by sets of ears and transmuted via eardrums into synaptic responses in the brain. Such sense-expressions may produce comprehension in the consciousness of some. Mikäli äänitorveni tuottamia ääniä muutetaan, ääniaallot tulevat selvemmin ymmärrettäviksi joillekin, kun taas toiset eivät enää ymmärrä niiden merkitystä. [In Finnish: If the sounds emanating from larynx are altered, some will comprehend the sound waves better, while for others, they will cease to make sense.]

Such a description of what is taking place here does however not suffice to get a grasp of what is actually happening. What is at stake is not merely the sending and reception of signals with meaning. Something beyond communication is done in, and by, the production of these sounds. Indeed, the social setting is appropriate, people with the right kind of symbolic capital are present, they produce the correct scripted phrases, and are even wearing the proper attire for the conjuring of academic 'social magic', and hopefully, as a result, produce a status transformation. Thereby, in the production of these sounds, I make arguments, by which my intention is to persuade my audience. Such actions are done within the social institution of the academic disputation of philosophical dissertations. Indeed, without this institution, rationality, or modality, it would not be possible to conjure the social magic of academic degrees.

Such insights: that language is used to do things beyond the communication of assertions is the kernel of what is called speech act theory. Succinctly put, this theory suggests that speech acts consist of three aspects: a locutionary act is an act of saying something, an illocutionary act is an act in saying something, and a perlocutionary act is an act by saying something. In order to achieve felicity or success for such acts, I have to follow certain conventions, which can be both grammatical and social, and the audience has to be able to achieve what is called uptake, in other words, reception and comprehension.

It is important to note here that although the theory is called speech act theory, speech acts are not about words – or verbs – but about 'force', about what an utterance 'does'. The force of an utterance may be brought about by words, but other forms of interaction can also produce the same effect.

These kinds of insights are also at the heart of the theoretical approach that I critically develop in my PhD thesis. The theory of securitisation focuses on the role and use of speech acts in the social construction of security.

Security issues are generally though to be both desirable and without alternative. There is also a sense that they are matters of extreme urgency and importance – we are dealing with issues of survival after all. Thereby, security matters should not be questioned. Furthermore, as a result, security arguments can be used to legitimise extreme measures, like conscription or the reduction of various liberties.

In contrast to such common viewpoints, the theory of securitisation suggests that issues of security are matters of political choice, like any other. The approach directs our attention to the power politics involved in how issues of security are made in social processes and interaction. In a way, the theory of securitisation describes the frame, script, plot or grammar of security – the way we have learned to understand what security is and what is security, as well as how something becomes security.

Securitisation describes the process of creation of the social fact of security, but the script or plot of security contains further elements. The script entails priority and utmost importance. A schema or prototype of security has six variables: a securitising actor, a referent object, a threat, an audience, facilitating conditions, and functional actors.

This approach, that was developed by my esteemed opponent some two decades ago, has inspired a fairly large literature. Perhaps unsurprisingly, much of this literature has concentrated on the identification of various shortfalls of the approach. Accordingly, there has been a constant flow of articles and books that identify problems with the application of the framework outside the European context, in which it was originally developed and applied.

All in all, although the great variety of studies conducted within the Securitisation Studies research programme is to be celebrated, the differences between various approaches may disperse the programme too much, and may result in communication difficulties among scholars who disagree on concepts and methods. Furthermore, although the critics and critical appliers of the approach have been industrious, most of these authors have failed to provide solutions for how to deal with the issues they raise; most critics of the approach have been satisfied to identify problems in it. The number of critiques without solutions reveals the need to refine the theory of securitisation.

My claim here is to have answers for some of the issues previous criticisms have identified. Through the explication of speech acts of securitisation, I demonstrate how securitisation has political functions beyond the provision of legitimacy for 'extraordinary measures', which has been the paradigmatic view of the approach. The explicated and subsequently more elaborate taxonomy of securitisation acts, that I produce in my study, makes it possible to incorporate most of the 'anomalies' identified by various critics within the basic model of securitisation, while still retaining its original uses.

The illocutionary logic of speech acts provides a meta-language to undertake cross-cultural studies of securitisation: it can be used to decompose illocutionary forces and thus avoid the anglocentrism of supposing universalities from the use of the English language. Acts of securitisation may not be achieved, or indeed manifested, in all societies or languages, but speech act logic can be used as a tool in the empirical study of whether illocutionary acts of securitisation do occur in specific situations, in any social context. Thus, even though security means different things to different societies, as the core fears of any group or nation are unique and relate to vulnerabilities and historical experiences, the social constitution of security can be studied with illocutionary logic, since human utterances universally exhibit 'force.' Which particular forces are universal or near universal, though, is a question for empirical linguistics, not securitisation studies. Nevertheless, illocutionary logic provides a means to describe these forces encoded into different languages, as well as specific utterances, and to compare them both intra- and inter-linguistically. The linguistic comparison of acts of securitisation provides a basis to undertake cross-cultural comparisons of such processes; a broader categorisation allows movement beyond the European and liberal democratic political context in studies of securitisation. (See Table 2.)

By means of the illocutionary logic of speech acts I contend in my thesis that there are at least five different strands of securitisation, and thereby, that securitisation can be used to do things beyond the legitimisation of extraordinary future deeds.

Firstly, securitisation can be used to raise an issue onto the agenda of decision makers, as was the case with the statement of the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists in conjunction with the 'unveiling' of the so called doomsday clock in 1947. The scientists, led by Albert Einstein, warned that unless atomic energy

Strand of securitisation	Elementary speech act sequence	Illocutionary point	Perlocutionary aim	Temporality	Degree of strength
Raising an issue onto the agenda	Claim Warn <i>e.g., suggest, urge, propose</i>	Directive	Agreement	Future	Has to be argued
Legitimatising future acts (Wæver's original strand)	Claim Warn <i>Request</i>	Directive	Legitimacy	Future	Has to be argued
Deterrence	Claim Warn <i>Declare</i>	Declarative	Intimidation/ Deterrence	Future	Declaration: Requires formal authority
Control	Claim Warn <i>Require</i>	Directive	Obedience/ Discipline	Future	Compelling: Requires formal authority and a reason
Legitimatising past acts or reproducing a security status	Claim Warn <i>Explain</i>	Assertive	Legitimacy	Past	Has to be argued

Table 2: The Five Strands of Securitisation.

was put under tight international control and the possibility of war was eliminated, our civilization would be destroyed in an atomic war, from which there is no defence.

The example of the Atomic Scientists reveals that not all securitising acts need to be about legitimising future acts, and that not all securitising moves need to be committed by speakers with the authority to effect their suggested 'remedies.' The Atomic Scientists literally created a global threat, that of the possibility of thermonuclear annihilation. Yet, the scientists lacked the authority of 'deciding' on the issues they raised; instead, they had to convince others of the necessity of their suggested remedies for dealing with existential threats. The logic of securitisation was clearly present here.

Secondly, securitisation can be used to legitimate future acts, as was the case in President George W. Bush's televised speech on September 12th 2001. The president warned that freedom and democracy were under attack and that this would require monumental efforts, and not business as usual, from the American people.

President Bush's speeches on September 11 and 12 defined the mood of world politics for the first decade of the 21st century. The claimed threat and the warning were used to legitimise extraordinary measures in the United States and, for example, the use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq. The claims and warnings of these initial speech acts and their numerous maintenances were expanded into the 'macrosecuritisation' discourse of the 'Global War on Terror'. These speech acts formed the basis for the legitimisation of various extraordinary measures, and similarly had major inter-unit effects both domestically and internationally.

Thirdly, securitisation can be used for deterrence, as was the case in the United Nations security council resolution 1377. The security council declared that acts of international terrorism constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century, and that acts of international terrorism constitute a challenge to all States and to all of humanity, which indicated a willingness to act on the part of the council.

While authorising states to do things, the resolution was also a signal to both state and non-state actors to desist from further such acts, or ‘face the consequences.’ This resolution is an example of how securitisation acts have been part of the deterrent strategies deployed in the ‘Global War on Terror’ macrosecuritisation discourse.

Fourthly, securitisation can be used to control subordinates, as was the case with the press releases and statements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization secretary general Lord Robertson, that invoked article five of the Washington Treaty for the first time, in response to the attacks of September 11 2001.


By invoking Article Five, the North Atlantic Council gained the power to compel and require its members to act in accordance with its decisions without the possibility of refusal. This process of securitisation within NATO demonstrates how the same ‘event’ can be securitised with various functions and with various effects.

Finally, securitisation can be used to legitimise past acts, or to reproduce the security status of an issue post hoc, as was the case in prime minister Tony Blair’s speech in March 2004. He legitimated the United Kingdom’s participation in the Iraq war with a claim that Iraq represented an existential threat for the UK and an explanation that this threat was acute and demanded immediate and drastic action.


Blair’s post-hoc maintenance of securitisation regarding the Iraq question was sufficient for the parliament to agree to the prime minister’s decision to go to war. This supports the argument that security is not always about the future; the security nature of an issue may have to be maintained, and sometimes it may be necessary to remind others of the acuteness of the securitisation when the process began. Including this strand in the model of securitisation allows the study of the various stages of real processes of securitisation, as the process continues, and as securitisation moves change shape.

These five strands of securitisation that I have explicated entail that they are securitisation. As the previous understanding of the function of securitisation, i.e., legitimating future acts of the securitising actor, is one of the strands proposed here, this logically means that the extension of securitisation increases; securitisation has less semantic information than its strands, which means that securitisation applies to a larger set of

### Original Formulation of Securitisation



### Explicated Formulation of Securitisation



entities than a single strand. With increased extension of the concept of securitisation, the phenomenon can be studied with more nuance, and in more socio-political contexts than before.

In my study, I apply securitisation theory to the analysis of the social construction of security in the People's Republic of China. The study of four cases from the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 up to the anti-Falungong campaign in 1999 allowed for the examination of securitisation in three major leadership eras of the PRC, as well as how securitisation has been contested and resisted in China. Furthermore, the cases also showed the political utility of desecuritisation, the negative corollary of securitisation.

The cases revealed that 'counter-revolution' was, for a long time, an institutionalised basis for securitisation, into which particular instances and chains of events were grafted. This demonstrates how, in one way, social artefacts – here issues of security – are sedimented into the 'background' of social reality. Although labels like 'turmoil' and 'well planned plots' would not seem to fit well into European political rhetoric, the language Chinese officials have used to construct official security realities is remarkably consistent with the 'grammar' that the theory of securitisation would predict, making it unnecessary to distort 'culturally alien' concepts to fit into the theory.

The PRC has its own set of institutionalised master signifiers, or watchwords of security. The logic of such institutionalised categories can remain constant, but the signifiers that refer to institutionalised signifieds can change. For instance, 'Lin Biao' was transformed from being originally a chief securitising actor and even Mao Zedong's heir apparent, to eventually, completely contrarily, an institutionalised signifier of 'counter-revolution'.

While the vocabulary may evolve in this way, the underlying logic appears to remain remarkably consistent throughout the political transitions from the Mao to the post-Mao eras of Chinese politics. Securitisation in the political sector is no longer as present in the everyday as it was during the Cultural Revolution, but when political crises do escalate, the same logic appears to rise to the fore, more or less reliably. This suggests that securitisation theory can be used to examine both Mao and post-Mao era politics through the same framework, which attests to its value for future investigations within China Studies.

The study of both major eras through the same framework showed that there is a significant difference in how securitisation has been utilised. In Mao's China, securitisation was used as a means to mobilise the 'masses' to fight inner enemies within the party and society, for example, through 'rectification'. It seems that in post-Mao China, securitisation is used as a reaction to more autonomous inputs or processes which emanate from within its society. In other words, in Mao's China, securitisation was used as a means to mobilise society; in post-Mao China, securitisation has conversely been used to suppress autonomous mobilisation in society. The uncovering of such a change seems to reflect general changes in Chinese society indicated by many other studies of China conducted with very different methods. Securitisation theory allows for the examination of such change without recourse to grand explanations.

In conclusion, in Larry Laudan's terms, the transformation of anomalous and unsolved empirical problems into solved ones is the hallmark of scientific progress. Such a viewpoint emphasises that theories should not be rejected out of hand: presumed empirical anomalies may be transformed into confirming instances via theory development. This kind of development may occur through the shift of relevant variables in the theory, which may eliminate troublesome anomalies or resolve some conceptual problems. For Laudan, theories are progressive if their problem solving capacity is increased.

In my thesis, I have shown how the anomalies previous critics have identified can be incorporated into the framework of securitisation while retaining its original applications. Furthermore, I have illustrated how the approach can be utilised to study Chinese politics without conceptual stretching. Indeed, the main argument of my study is that the explication of the five strands of securitisation increases the problem solving capacity of the theory of securitisation and that thereby it progresses the research programme of securitisation studies.

# Enforcing the Laws of Anarchical Society: the Case of Iran in the United Nations Security Council



Tytti Erästö

Lectio praecursoria

University of Tampere, 25 January 2013

My PhD thesis deals with a very topical issue of international politics, namely the dispute over Iran's nuclear program. Given the extensive media reporting during the last ten years, almost everyone has some kind of an idea, and often also a personal opinion about this complex and yet unresolved issue. Even informed expert opinions vary to a significant degree regarding the definition of the core problems, as well as potential solutions to the nuclear dispute, making this into a highly contested and politicized realm.

This is clearly a challenge for academic research, which easily gets caught in the related polemics. One way to avoid the problem would appear to be to stick only to the hard facts and let them speak their own, seemingly plain language. For example, it is a fact that Iran did not report all of its nuclear activities to the international Atomic Energy Agency prior to 2003. It is also a fact that this lack of transparency has been defined as noncompliance of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), on which basis the United Nations (UN) Security Council has made an exceptional demand for the country to halt uranium enrichment.

However, facts can only get us so far—they beg interpretation. This is because we are dealing with a problem that is essentially social in nature. To understand international social reality, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of international interaction by interpreting language and discourses in the relevant historical context. In my thesis, I have tried to do this by analyzing the rhetoric of UN Security Council members and Iran in the period from 2006 to 2009—that is, during the first four years when the Council was dealing with the Iranian case.

I argue that, partly as a result of this legal process, the dominant discourse or narrative that has guided the interpretation of the problem has been that of crime and punishment. According to it, Iran's continuing defiance of international law has left the international society no choice but to impose punitive measures in the form of economic sanctions. This interpretation is more or less explicitly offered to us by mainstream media and those key actors who have played an instrumental role in imposing sanctions on Iran.

In my thesis, I refer to this kind of interpretation as the 'solidarist paradigm'. The term solidarism comes from the so-called English School theory of International Relations, and it means faith in international norm-enforcement. As a counter-concept to solidarism, the theory also offers the notion of 'pluralism' which, respectively, refers to skepticism about international norm-enforcement.

My thesis begins from a pluralist premise. It sets out to critically examine the appropriateness of the narrative of crime and punishment as a basis for understanding and dealing with the Iranian nuclear dispute. In order to prepare the ground for the empirical study, the theoretical discussion in my thesis sheds light on the potential explanations behind arguments both for and against norm-enforcement from the English School perspective.

It highlights the fact that pluralists share with solidarists the desire to maintain international society based on shared norms. At the same time, pluralists stress that there are some fundamental differences between domestic society and international society that should be considered when dealing with the problem of non-conformity with international norms.

The main difference has to do with the blatant fact that there is neither a universal sovereign, nor a proper system of adjudication in the society states. This is why Hedley Bull refers to international society as the 'Anarchical Society', which I also use in the title of my thesis.

This notion is different from the Realist understanding of anarchy. For example, Realists like Hans Morgenthau regard international norm-enforcement as a power-political tool by the Great Powers in the pursuit of their own narrow interests. The English School pluralists can be seen to partly share this assumption—in other words, they agree that norm-enforcement can be detrimental to international order if it is politically motivated. At the same time, however, they stress that irresponsible Great Power policies can be kept in check by international institutions, such as the UN Security Council. The key word here is legitimacy: in order to pass as norm-enforcement, any acts of coercion must be backed by sufficient international consensus that a severe breach of norms has taken place and that it requires punitive measures.

While this is the most commonly discussed pluralist premise, the presence of legitimacy does not necessarily ensure the success of norm-enforcement in promoting international order. I argue that this point is highlighted in the Iranian case, which has been characterized by broad support for international sanctions. Indeed, during the period under study, there was only one abstention and one negative vote for the relevant resolutions undertaken in the UNSC. This seems to suggest a considerable degree of genuine belief in the positive effects of norm-enforcement among Council members.

However, the findings of my thesis suggest that this belief, as far as it exists, is misguided: in other words, I do not agree that the sanctions have had a positive effect on international order. In addition to stating the rather obvious fact that the sanctions against Iran have been ineffective to date, I also argue that they are unlikely to contribute to their desired goals in the future. This is basically because of the unrealistic demand for a complete cessation of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle activities, and because of the political conflict between the US and Iran.

To understand this point, it's necessary to try to understand what is at stake in the nuclear issue from the Iranian perspective. First of all, the nuclear issue is a matter of energy economics, like nuclear programs tend to be for most countries—even though the economic rationale has been increasingly undermined by the sanctions.

Second, the nuclear dispute is a question of principle and prestige for Iran. Iranians are aware that the UN Security Council's zero enrichment demand represents an exception that doesn't apply to any other state. The stakes have been raised by the fact that the Iranian leaders have presented the dispute as an independence struggle. In a country whose national ideology is largely based on resisting foreign exploitation, giving in on this highly politicized issue could have direct implications for regime security.

This is the case especially because the Iranian leaders suspect that compliance will end up being against the country's interests. Indeed, this leads to a third and what I regard as the most significant point, which is Iran's mistrust towards the P5+1 group—consisting of the permanent UN Security Council members and Germany. More specifically, this mistrust has to do with the difficult relationship between the US and Iran, who have not had diplomatic relations for 30 years.

The main problem here is the lack of clarity about US goals. The US has traditionally viewed the Iranian regime as the source of a complex tangle of problems, which not only include non-proliferation but also support for anti-Israeli groups, opposition to US presence in the Middle East, human rights abuse, and involvement in real and imagined terrorist actions. In effect, many influential policy makers in the US continue to believe that only regime change can provide a lasting solution to all of these problems. This position largely explains the

absence of real attempts at multilateral nuclear diplomacy until 2009, when Obama came to power.

From the Iranian perspective, the Bush administration's apparent lack of interest in negotiations seemed to confirm that the US was indeed more interested in regime change than non-proliferation. The lack of clarity about the US end goals is enforced by the fact that the P5+1 have not had a clear long-term strategy, either, as they have focused almost exclusively on short-term goals.

The offered incentives and prospect of normalization of relations which is supposed to follow from Iran's compliance is also undermined by the complex set of American unilateral sanctions. These sanctions are difficult to lift and they create legal obstacles for normal interaction—also between Iran and third parties.

The most serious aspect of Iran's mistrust, however, has to do with the threats of pre-emptive military action and the apparent lack of sensitivity to Iran's security concerns. Indeed, this problem lies at the heart of the dispute, as military insecurity gives Iran a strong incentive to hold on to uranium enrichment, and thus reserve the option of getting a nuclear weapon to avoid being attacked.

Although the military rationale has so far been rejected by the Iranian leadership, the situation might change if the current tensions continue, or if a war breaks out. Indeed, Iran has announced it will withdraw from the NPT if attacked.

In effect, the current coercive approach is not only ineffective but contributing exactly to the kind of scenario that it was supposed to prevent. In other words, Iran is being pushed to proliferate. The fact that this remains so poorly understood has much to do with the representation of the problem; after all, in the narrative of crime and punishment, the perspective of the norm-breaker is viewed as largely irrelevant. This narrative also tells us that the only strategy available is to wait and see the latest sanctions produce results, add even more crippling sanctions, or—as the final option—resort to military action. The problem is that all of these options are based on wishful thinking.

To be sure, the relevant actors have not been entirely blind to the existing problems. As my study shows, skepticism regarding the coercive approach has been expressed by several Security Council members throughout the period under study. For example, Russia, China and several non-permanent members have suggested at different stages that they were not convinced that sanctions would improve the situation.

The fact that such concerns are not as a rule not reflected in their voting behavior can be regarded as an indication of at least some degree of political pressure behind the Security Council scenes. Most of all, however, I would argue that the positive votes reflect the perceived lack of better alternatives, or the view that sanctions at least provide a preferable alternative to military action.

However, the risks of sticking to the current approach and viewing it as somehow inevitable are being gradually realized by the US and the rest of the P5+1 group. The first signs of this were seen when President Obama came to power. At the time, he stressed the importance of unconditional negotiations and trust-building between the US and Iran. He also quietly acknowledged the need to withdraw from the zero enrichment demand, so as to make room for a compromise solution.

Such efforts could be seen as attempts to move away from the solidarist paradigm and the underlying Hobbesian conflict dynamics towards an approach that could be called 'conflict management'. In practice, this has meant that Iran is treated more like a sovereign partner in the negotiations, rather than an illegitimate rogue state. Unfortunately, domestic politics both on the Iranian and US side quickly discredited this approach, leading to further escalation of the confrontation.

In the midst of this escalation, there was a partial return to the conflict management approach last year. One sign of this is that zero enrichment has no longer been among the P5+1 proposals. Given that this demand is nevertheless made in other contexts and that sanctions continue to be based on it, the goals of the current



P5+1 approach are rather ambiguous at the moment. Their position also continues to reflect an excessive belief in the possibility that Iran can be coerced to make major concessions though the harsh sanctions that are now in place.

A half-hearted conflict management approach based on vague goals runs the risk of failure and a new phase of escalation. What is needed instead is full commitment to conflict resolution, meaning real efforts to find a mutually acceptable compromise.

In practice, this would have to mean for the P5+1 to accept an Islamic Republic with a uranium enrichment capacity in exchange for Iran's commitment to limit that capacity and accept intrusive inspections.

In order to overcome the obstacles in the way of such a compromise, I conclude that a paradigm shift is needed on two levels. The first one would need to involve the broader international society, meaning a general turn away from the current disciplinarian approach towards greater pragmatism. To put it simply, it would mean sacrificing the short-term goal of zero enrichment for the long-term goals of confidence-building and nonproliferation, which are likewise written into the UN Security Council resolutions.

The second paradigm shift concerns the Hobbesian dynamics of bilateral US-Iranian relations, which will have to develop towards a more normal kind of international interaction. The most urgent measure would be to put an end to military threats and talk about red lines, as this is affecting Iran's decision-making regarding the need for a nuclear deterrent. The US also needs to assure Iran that there are limits to its policy of containment.

I argue that the difficulty of taking these steps highlights certain key problems in the contemporary international society. To be sure, the broader phenomenon of which the Iranian case is part can be viewed in a positive light. Along with other cases of post-Cold War norm-enforcement, it undoubtedly tells about the increasing importance of international law in shaping international relations.

However, my analysis suggests that norm-enforcement might be even too easy in today's world. After all, in the Iranian nuclear dispute it was resorted to before diplomatic means had been exhausted. Moreover, the legal process of enforcement actually made the problem worse by creating obstacles to further diplomatic efforts.

The Iranian nuclear issue therefore raises crucial questions about the legitimacy of contemporary practices of international exclusion and their impact on international order. Most of all, it questions the ability of the UN Security Council to safeguard international security, especially in situations defined by asymmetric conflict involving one of the P5 members.

It also gives reason for further concern about the potential demise of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Apart from highlighting the risks of further proliferation that might follow from Iran's potential withdrawal from the treaty, another source of concern has to do with the policies of the P5 countries, most notably the US.

Their idea that arms control can be achieved exclusively through coercion, and their tendency to confuse the mutually exclusive goals of non-proliferation and regime change is bound to create insecurity among countries that have reason to believe that they too might end up as targets of regime change. This might lead more states than just Iran to see benefits in developing a nuclear deterrent.

From this perspective, the way the Iranian nuclear dispute is handled can have far-reaching implications for international order. It is true that a pragmatic conflict resolution approach based on compromise with Iran might question the resolve and consistency of the P5+1 in pursuing their disciplinarian approach. At the same time, it would help restore the lost trust in international institutions and to demonstrate that international norms are not enforced for their own or the enforcers' sake, but based on a reasonable assessment of what best serves the higher goal of international peace and security.

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